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  In  1922,  the  historian  Oswald  Spengler  foresaw  “an  appalling 
depopulation” as one of the manifestations of the “Decline of the West”. 
Has there been a continuity in population development since the early 
20th century in Europe? Could you please give us an overview of the 
most important demographic shifts and trends of this region during the 
last century?  
 
To adequately describe 20th-century demographic developments in Europe 
would of course take a whole book. Differences from country to country and 
between  various  social strata  are  just  too  great.  Yet  the  key  facets  of  the 
overall process can be easily summarised. Demographic change is driven by 
mortality, fertility, and migration. As to mortality, the life expectancy at birth 
nearly doubled over a century: by 2000 it was slightly over 73 years for males 
and females combined.  
 
The trend was steadily upward, albeit with two sharp set-backs: the first due 
to World War I and the influenza epidemic that closely followed it; the second, 
also bad but less devastating, due to World War II. All-in-all, an extraordinarily 
positive achievement. Fertility’s evolution was dominantly downward; by the 
1930s some country populations and many subpopulations exhibited below-
replacement  levels.  The  post-World  War  II  baby-boom,  although  more 
moderate than in Europe’s overseas offshoots - most notably in the US -, was 
a  significant  but  temporary reversal in  the  trend.  In  the last  quarter  of  the 
century rapid decline resumed and became near-universal, bringing below-
replacement  fertility,  and  often  deeply  below-replacement  fertility,  in  all 
countries  of  Europe  by  the  turn  of  the  millennium.  With  respect  to  inter-
continental  migration,  massive  European  outmigration  was  brought  to  an 
abrupt halt by World War I. Net migratory balances in the following 40 years 
were  very  modest.  But  in  the  last  decades  of  the  century  substantial 
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immigrant flows from outside Europe have materialised, affecting mostly the 
economically more dynamic countries.  
 
Through the combined effects of these forces, as measured by any historical 
standard,  Europe’s  population  grew  rapidly  during  the  century:  from  some 
390 million in 1900 to some 730 million by the year 2000. A bit more than half 
of this increase occurred in the second half of the century. The year 1900 
actually provides a very arbitrary demarcation of the beginning of an epoch. 
That dominant trend of improving survival can be traced back to well before 
1900. Fertility decline, too, had started earlier: in the case of France as far 
back as the second part of the 18th century.  
 
For many other European countries the downward slide began in the 1880s 
or 1890s. The turn of the millennium, in contrast, is not a bad marker of the 
completion  of  the  process  of  demographic  transition:  a  transition  from  a 
combination of high mortality and high ferility to a combination of low mortality 
and  low  fertility.  Europe  pioneered  that  enormously  significant  historical 
process, setting an example for the rest of the world to follow. The lagged 
response of fertility to mortality change meant that the process generated a 
major increase in population size. But by 2000, natural population increase -
change apart from migration - came to an end for the continent as a whole. In 
this,  too,  Europe’s  performance  prefigures  what  will  happen  -  needs  to 
happen - elsewhere in the world. Demographic expansion cannot continue 
indefinitely. At some point stasis, or even modest correction through negative 
growth, is both inevitable and desirable. Europe is at that point now. 
 
  Europe’s share of world population is in decline. Is this something to 
worry about?  
 
Normally one should not worry about things that are inevitable. Europe’s loss 
of relative share within the world’s total population has been of course steady 
during the past century and has been accelerating. It is bound to continue as 
far as demographers’ eyes can see. In 1950, Europe’s share within the global 
population was some 22 per cent. Today - in 2010 - it may be estimated as 
slightly short of 11 per cent.  
 
What will the future bring? Population projections are a risky business, but the 
UN’s medium estimate for that share in 2050 is 7.5 per cent. That estimate 
assumes substantial recovery of European fertility from its current very low 
levels and also historically high net immigration – roughly 1 million persons 3 
 
per year. On those assumptions, Europe’s 2050 population would be some 
690  million  (or  about  40  million  less  than  in  2010).  The  relative  share  is 
mostly  dictated  by  what  happens  outside  Europe.  Europe’s  main  concern 
should be how that 690 million - a very respectable number - will prosper, and 
how adequately it will be reproducing itself. 
 
  Europe is worried about its demographic future. Public awareness of 
demographic  change  is  growing.  What  are  the  key  drivers  behind 
population ageing in today’s Europe?  
 
The key drivers are those three factors we just talked about. Since population 
growth cannot go on forever, the convenient reference point is a population in 
which births and deaths roughly balance out: a stationary population or one 
whose underlying fertility and mortality characteristics make it headed in that 
direction.  When  just  about  everyone  survives  at  least  up  to  age  50, 
stationarity requires  an  average of  very  slightly  more  than  2  children  over 
women’s  life  time.  When  fertility  falls  short  of  that  level,  the  base  of  the 
population pyramid narrows, making the population older. And of course in 
modern  times  survival  into  high  old  age  is  increasingly  and  gratifyingly 
common, making an important contribution to population ageing. 
 
  The above mentioned Oswald Spengler quoted Shaw, who said the 
following  in  the  section  of  the  “The  quintessence  of  Ibsenism”  titled 
“The  Womanly  Woman”  (1891):  ”...unless  Woman  repudiates  her 
womanliness, her duty to her husband, to her children, to society, to the law, 
and to everyone but herself, she cannot emancipate herself". He continued 
as follows: “The primary woman, the peasant woman, is mother. The whole 
vocation towards which she has yearned from childhood is included in that 
one word. But now emerges the Ibsen woman, the comrade, the heroine of a 
whole megalopolitan literature from Northern drama to Parisian novel. Instead 
of children, she has soul-conflicts; marriage is a craft-art for the achievement 
of ’mutual understanding.’ It is all the same whether the case against children 
is  the  American  lady's  who  would  not  miss  a  season  for  anything,  or  the 
Parisienne's who fears that her lover would leave her, or an Ibsen heroine's 
who  ’belongs  to  herself’--  they  all  belong  to  themselves  and  they  are  all 
unfruitful.” What was the attitude of Europe towards population changes 
and their significance at the earlier 20th century? 
 
Such arguments, whether voiced a hundred years ago or at any time since, 
are little short of bizarre. Take the irrelevant contrast between the “primary 4 
 
woman”  and  the  modern  emancipated  woman.  Collective  survival  under 
conditions of high mortality of course required high fertility, an average of, say, 
six children per woman or even more, whilst today it requires two children: we 
are talking about completely different demographic regimes.  
 
Shaw,  a  brilliant  playwright,  was  deeply  interested  in  social  analysis  and 
policy and wrote many penetrating pages on the subject of population. The 
sentence  quoted  by  Spengler  is  one  of  those  pronouncements  where  its 
author  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to  exaggerate  and  to  shock  in  the 
service  of  a  good  cause.  No  emancipation  of  women  without  repudiating 
womanliness and duty to children? An absurd idea. And amplifying on Shaw’s 
false proposition, Spengler goes into an even deeper end. It is bad sociology, 
bad economics, and bad social psychology. Bad demography, too.  
 
Nearly  a  century  after  his  book  appeared,  we  find  that  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  European  women  -  typically  80  to  90  per  cent  of  them  -  still 
become  mothers,  and  do  so  by  choice.  Do  they  bemoan  the  loss  of  the 
supposed  pleasures  recited  by  Spengler?  If  a  large  percentage  of  these 
mothers do not have a second or third child, the causes for that failure should 
be  found  in  problems  more  real  than  “missing  a  season”  and  similar 
calamities. 
 
  In  2007,  the  European  Commission  formulated  and  commissioned 
the  report  on  “The demographic  future  of  Europe—from  challenge  to 
opportunity” (European Commission 2006)
2. The paper has initiated a 
debate. In your article: “A clouded view of Europe’s demographic future” 
(2007)
3 ,  you  pointed  out  that  the  “challenges  and  opportunities” 
identified in the report largely miss their target. What do you regard as 
the most important failings of the document? 
 
The report was of course a consensus document. Not surprisingly, it had a 
tendency  to  adopt  a  language  and  formulations  that  were  calculated  to 
smooth over differences of opinion on difficult issues or treat major relevant 
subjects perfunctorily if at all.  
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Does  Europe  need  more  people  and  if  so,  why?  What  demographic 
configurations justify policy interventions and what forms should they take? 
Why immigration should be encouraged and from what sources and in what 
characteristics and in what volume? Are there alternatives to garden-variety 
welfare  state  policies  and  what  effects  such  alternative  approaches  might 
exert on demographic behaviour? And, not the least, what is the European 
framework  in  which  such  questions  should  be  addressed?  What  are  the 
desirable boundaries of the report’s Europe – then conceived as the EU25 
but with the prospect for enlargement open? Is Europe more than a glorified 
customs union and is its population more than simply the sum total of the 
population of the member states? Or does the label “the people [in singular] 
of  the  European  Union”  have  a  special  meaning,  now  or  in  an  expected 
future?  
 
  You  have  emphasised  the  obliviousness  of  the  Comission  of  the 
issue  of  population  size  and  growth.  Why  is  it  important  to  consider 
these issues when discussing Europe’s demographic future? 
 
The Commission did touch on these issues by its comforting reference to a 
projected very modest decline in the EU25’s population size: some 2 per cent 
loss by 2050. It turns out, however, that the prospect of such near-stasis was 
achieved  by  assuming  a  net immigrant  flow  of  some  40  million  (plus  their 
descendants), “conservatively estimated”, as the report put it. But the size of 
net  immigration  (unlike  the  number  of  births  where  grass-roots  parental 
decisions rule, and unlike the number of deaths, where the aim of private 
efforts and public policies converge in the intent to keep them at a minimum) 
is  a policy  variable  par  excellence.  How  is the  40  million immigrant  figure 
determined?  It  would  be  natural  to  start  with  population  projections  in  the 
absence of immigration and address the question to what extent, if at all, the 
results of such projections may be problematic. Can society and the economy 
adjust  to  population  decline  and  how?  What  are  the  disadvantages  and 
advantages of a smaller and older population? If correction is needed, what 
should be the main thrust of policy intervention? These are the key questions 
that should have been the Commission’s task to pose and answer.  
 
  One of the failings of the above mentioned report you named is the 
cluelessness about fertility policy. European policy makers have not yet 
decided whether they should make the level of fertility rate an explicit 
object of government policies. What is the reason for the helplessness 6 
 
of governments when facing the issue of population change? Do you 
regard pronatalist policies as justified? 
 
The Commission’s report carefully avoids reference to the politically incorrect 
term  of  pronatalism.  It  speaks,  instead,  of  “demographic  renewal”,  an 
anodyne expression signalling, it would seem, more or less the same intent. 
More  recently,  there  has  been  some  shift  in  terminology  and  explicitness. 
This is reflected in a hefty (almost 500 pages) United Nations report World 
Population Policies, 2009, that has just appeared. It characterises member 
state population policies and government attitudes in lapidary phrases. There 
is of course no EU policy on population matters; what EU members think or 
do  is  reflected  in  27  country  summaries,  with  two  pages  allotted  to  each 
country.  Uniformity  is  complete  with  respect  to  “Level  and  concern  about 
population age structure”. For the last available year (2009) EU governments 
all  declare  that  “Size  of  the  working-age  population”  and  “Ageing  of  the 
population” both represent “Major concern”. On “Population size and growth” 
and  on  “Fertility”  there  is  a  degree  of  dissonance,  apparently  reflecting  a 
mixture of prevailing political and ideological positions and the most recent 
birth statistics. Still, not surprisingly, the majority of EU member governments 
view population growth as “Too low” and characterise their policy intent on 
population growth as “Raise”. Similarly, the majority view the fertility level as 
“Too  low”  and  declare  that  their  policy  on  fertility  is  to  “Raise”  it.  (On 
immigration, once again, uniformity rules: governments blandly pronounce it 
as “Satisfactory” and their attitude to immigration policy is to “Maintain”.) 
 
Intent  and  deed,  however,  do  not  easily  go  hand-in-hand.  Policies  are 
formulated  in  a  political  arena  that  seeks  to  weigh  costs  and  benefits  of 
specific  measures  as  determined  under  the  prevailing  rules  of  the  game. 
When fertility is in the neighbourhood of replacement level - neighbourhood 
being fairly broadly interpreted as perhaps down to a period TFR of 1.6 or 1.7 
- it is difficult to argue that costly intervention (costly in terms of either public 
expenditure or political onus) to raise fertility is justified. Various pro-family 
social policies, adopted and supported for reasons other than raising the birth 
rate,  then  are  presented  as  also  pronatalist,  since  possibly  having  that 
beneficial  by-product.  When  fertility  is  below  replacement  level  by  a  wide 
margin,  arguments  for  explicit  pronatalist  measures  are  able  to  command 
greater political support. The problem is the paucity of effective measures that 
have the desired effect. The main recipe is increasing socialisation of child-
rearing costs and institutional arrangements that create a more child-friendly 
social environment and make motherhood and women’s participation in the 7 
 
formal labour force more compatible. The record of these approaches thus far 
is not encouraging. 
 
  Some  European  countries  like France,  Britain  or  the  Scandinavian 
countries  have  relatively  high  fertility  levels,  others,  like  most  of  the 
Eastern  European  countries  have  lower  fertility  levels.  What  should 
governments  of  countries  with  very  low  fertility  consider  during 
contemplating what to do? 
 
They  can  certainly  study  apparent  success  stories  and  consider  policy 
approaches that would seem as promising. But the task is not easy since 
lessons are far from obvious. It is less than clear to what extent better fertility 
performance  in  the  countries  mentioned  are  policy-related.  Current  fertility 
levels in France and in the UK, for example, are very similar yet their social 
policies related to fertility are quite different. And not long ago, such as in the 
1980s  and  earlier,  Scandinavian  countries  were  very  much  in  the  lower 
segment  of  European  countries  when  ranked  by  the level  of  fertility,  even 
though  their  fertility-relevant  social  policies  were  considered  as  the  most 
“progressive”.  Recovery  of  fertility  (or  rather  just  some  movement  edging 
closer  to  replacement  level)  is  not  necessarily  explainable  by  further 
reinforcement of such policies. There are no hard-and-fast rules - economic, 
social, psychological - that govern fertility behaviour. Just a few years ago, 
fertility in the former East Germany was far below the level prevailing in West 
Germany. Today, East Germany’s fertility catching up with West Germany’s 
appears to be fully accomplished. Welcome surprises may well be in store in 
Eastern  and  Southern  Europe,  too,  in  the  coming  decade.  Ex-post,  such 
recoveries, however natural and spontaneous, will no doubt be attributed to 
wise policies. Such claims will rest on weak foundations. 
 
  Many  of  the  articles  related  to  demographic  change  and  policy 
issues  contain  interesting  ideas  but  lack  practical  suggestions  for 
implementing them. You suggested a couple of years ago that pension 
entitlements should be re-linked positively to the number of offspring 
produced (Demeny, 1987)? What is the main idea behind this? 
 
Historically,  intergenerational  financial  exchanges  and  other  support 
arrangements took place within the family. Modern industrial societies made 
old-age  support  dominantly  state-organised,  relying  on  taxing  the  active 
labour force and distributing pensions to the retired. This severs an important 
link between willingness to raise children and material security in old age. Re-8 
 
establishing an at least partial yet significant linkage between child-rearing 
and entitlement for old-age support would be a potential stimulus for fertility, 
especially  under  circumstances  of  an  ageing  society  when  government-
promised pension rights come to be regarded as increasingly tenuous.  
 
  The idea of “Demeny voting” has been recently discussed intensely 
in Japan, another country with rapidly declining fertility rates. Can you 
explain  us  what  this  voting  rule  exactly  means?  How  would  its 
implementation affect families with children? 
 
In all countries, the very young - such as those under age 18 or even 20 - 
represent  a  disenfranchised  population.  Yet  their  stake  in  wise  long-term 
public  policies  is  very  high  (stretching  up  to  the  region  of  a  century),  in 
contrast to the old-age population whose relative numerical weight within the 
electorate is increasingly heavy, yet whose self-interested time horizon is far 
shorter. The young could be given electoral weight through representation by 
their natural or custodial parents. For example, votes for under-age girls could 
be exercised by their mother and for boys by their father. Other assignment of 
voting  rights  could  also  be  contemplated.  A  radical  version,  for  example, 
could weight all votes (including children’s votes exercised by parents) by the 
average  life  expectancy  at  the  voter’s  age.  Technically  this  (or  a  less 
discriminatory,  but  still  age-related  vote-weighting  scheme)  could  be  easily 
accomplished.  
 
The  constitutional  and  political  obstacles  to  such  a  reform  are  of  course 
enormous. But active advocacy of it and the ensuing debates would have a 
potentially  strong  policy-influencing  effect  in  highlighting  the  inherent  time-
horizon bias affecting current policy decisions. I don’t think of the proposal as 
a  fertility-stimulating  measure,  although  the  recognition  of  parental 
contribution to collective social survival would have merit and perhaps some 
effect. The shift in the composition of representative political bodies should, 
however,  contribute  to  saner  policies  reflecting  less  myopic  time  horizons 
than is common in present-day policymaking.  
 
  Last but not least, let me ask you a question concerning the project 
FAMILYPLATFORM. We are now at the final stage of the platform and 
the  main  goal  is  to  develop  a  research  agenda  that  encompasses 
fundamental research issues as well as key policy questions in order to 
provide  an  input  into  the  EU’s  Socio-Economic  and  Humanities 
Research Agenda on Family Research and Family Policies. Could you 9 
 
name some important research needs related to demographic change 
whose  analyses  could  help  in  increasing  the  wellbeing  of  families 
across Europe? 
 
It would be easy to offer a long list of what ought to be researched and what 
policies should be contemplated. Reading the scientific output of the by now 
very large and very active demographic community, whether in Europe or in 
North America, gives a good sense of what demographers do and what policy 
ideas  they  have.  It  gives,  unfortunately,  also  a  sense  of  frustration  and  a 
sense of lack of progress: much rehashing of familiar ideas and decorating 
them with formal analytic virtuosity.  
 
Instead of elaborating on this complaint, I will be wiser to mention only one 
idea whose exploration would challenge researchers in demography and also 
stimulate policy makers. Social policies, nowadays also extending to attempts 
to  deal  with  population  issues,  originated  more  than  a  century  ago  from 
attempts to deal with issues of poverty affecting a substantial segment of the 
population. As advanced economies developed and incomes rose, the share 
of the poor within the population shrunk and material standards - nutrition, 
health, housing, education, spatial mobility, and leisure - improved across the 
board. Yet the main direction of social policies ran counter to that uplifting 
trend.  Arrangements  originally  designed  for  the  downtrodden  became 
generalised and extended to all. Indeed, much of the redistributive function of 
the modern welfare state, now involving more than a third of national income, 
consists of taking money from the comfortably-off to reward the comfortably-
off.  The  realistic  perspective  for  the  future,  current  economic  set-backs 
notwithstanding, is further steady material improvement. Yet there is a strong 
likelihood  that  gravitation  toward  ever  greater  government-engineered 
redistribution  of  incomes  will  continue  in  the  name  of  good  causes  and 
programmes,  including  programmes  supposedly  justified  by  adverse 
demographic developments. Does this system growing out from uplifting the 
downtrodden make sense in an affluent society? Can’t it be that perhaps 10 
per cent of the population experiencing hard times (for no fault of their own) 
be decently taken care of, whilst at the same time avoid treating the rest as if 
they  are incapable  of  taking  care  of  themselves?  Demographers  are  well-
placed  to  pose  such  unorthodox  questions, since  the  arrangements  of  the 
modern welfare state are not exempt from well-founded suspicion of being 
responsible  for  some  untoward  characteristics  of  contemporary  society, 
including disorganisation of the family system and sub-replacement fertility. 
The prospect of fundamental social reform may seem utopian today. But the 10 
 
matter  deserves  thinking,  analysis  of  options,  and  contemplation  of  radical 
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